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Interpersonal impression formation is highly consequential for social interactions in private
and public domains. These perceptions of others rely on different sources of information
and processing mechanisms, all of which have been investigated in independent research
fields. In social psychology, inferences about states and traits of others as well as
activations of semantic categories and corresponding stereotypes have attracted great
interest. On the other hand, research on emotion and reward demonstrated affective and
motivational influences of social cues on the observer, which in turn modulate attention,
categorization, evaluation, and decision processes. While inferential and categorical social
processes have been shown to recruit a network of cortical brain regions associated
with mentalizing and evaluation, the affective influence of social cues has been linked to
subcortical areas that play a central role in detection of salient sensory input and reward
processing. In order to extend existing integrative approaches to person perception,
both the inferential-categorical processing of information about others, and affective and
motivational influences of this information on the beholder should be taken into account.
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INTRODUCTION
For humans, other people are one of the most important sources
of joy and sorrow. Our perception of others has far-reaching con-
sequences for immediate reactions as well as for the likelihood
and nature of future interactions. Thus, in everyday life, impres-
sion formation is crucial not only for private relationships but
also for decisions regarding economic or political affairs (Delgado
et al., 2005; Uleman et al., 2008; Antonakis and Dalgas, 2009).
Due to its relevance, “person perception” in its broadest sense,
i.e., covering sensory, cognitive, and affective processing of infor-
mation about others, has generated intense research interest in a
variety of disciplines. This widespread interest is in part due to
the fact that the perception of persons fundamentally differs from
that of objects insofar as it involves recognition of some other as
an epistemic and moral subject and the possibility of reciprocity
(Sturma, 1997).
Empirical approaches toward person perception describe dif-
ferent sources of person-related information and different kinds
of impact of this information on the decoder. Within the classic
social psychological research on categorical representation of oth-
ers and inferences about others’ current mental states and endur-
ing personality traits, the person-related cues are seen as providers
of diagnostic knowledge (Kelley, 1967; Trope, 1986; Mitchell et al.,
2006; Freeman et al., 2010b). But psychological and neurosci-
entific research also demonstrated that interpersonal social cues
have an intrinsic affective and motivational value and are able
to influence sensory, inference and decision processes, as well
as response selection (Klin et al., 2003; Winkielman et al., 2005;
Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007; Schilbach et al., 2010). The rela-
tive involvement of these well-documented inferential-categorical
and affective-motivational processes in person perception, how-
ever, crucially depends on the specific information format,
e.g., whether information is conveyed verbally or non-verbally
(Freeman et al., 2010b; Zaki et al., 2010; Kuzmanovic et al., 2012).
Critically, all these different approaches to person percep-
tion do not refer to processes that run independently, rather,
they reciprocally modulate each other and the final infor-
mation integration (Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007; Pessoa,
2008; Freeman and Ambady, 2011; Freeman et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, empirical and theoretical approaches mostly focus
only on one selective aspect of person perception, and are
only beginning to develop integrative and comprehensive mod-
els (Freeman and Ambady, 2011; Freeman et al., 2012). For
instance, the dynamic interactive theory of person construal
integrates insights from social psychology and functional neu-
roimaging research related to face-processing by emphasizing
complex interactions of cognitive processes underlying initial
activation of categories (and corresponding stereotypes) and fur-
ther higher order social reasoning (Freeman and Ambady, 2011;
Freeman et al., 2012). This theory provides an excellent frame-
work based on a recurrent connectionist model (Freeman and
Ambady, 2011) and does refer to “top-down influences that
originate in the perceiver (e.g., existing knowledge structures
and motivations) and (. . . ) bottom-up influence of factors that
originate in the target of perception (e.g., overlapping visual
cues)” (Freeman et al., 2012, p. 3). However, while this frame-
work considers bottom-up influences of sensory input on cat-
egory and stereotype activation, it does not explicitly address
affective and motivational properties of social stimuli resulting
in enhanced and prioritized processing and reward-dependent
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learning effects. These effects have been extensively documented
in the emotion and reward-related neuroimaging research (see
section Affective Influences of Person-related Information on the
Decoder), even in newborns without fully developed proposi-
tional knowledge (Farroni et al., 2002), and do not have to relate
to categorical organization of social cognition that is described
in the person construal theory (Vuilleumier and Pourtois,
2007). By delineating distinct approaches to person perception
related to cognitive inferential-categorical processing (section
Person-related Knowledge as a Basis for Social Reasoning) and
affective-motivational influences (section Affective Influences of
Person-related Information on the Decoder), respectively, and
by specifying relative processing differences for verbal and non-
verbal formats of information (section Processing Differences
for Distinct Formats of Person-related Information), the present
paper aims to extend existing integrative views on person per-
ception by emphasizing the critical role of salience and reward-
related effects within the dynamic processing of social others
(section Integration of Distinct but Interactive Person Perception
Aspects).
PERSON-RELATED KNOWLEDGE AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL
REASONING
Traditionally, social psychology has been primarily interested in
how we form high-level impressions of others and how knowl-
edge about others is represented within a categorically organized
semantic system (Freeman and Ambady, 2011). Originally, it
was supposed that people are trying to causally explain the
observed behavior of others. Attribution Theory defined con-
ditions in which logical and objective reasoning leads to the
assumption of internal, i.e., disposition-related, or external, i.e.,
situation-related, causes for actions, dependent upon the avail-
able information about the target person (Heider, 1958; Jones
and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967). Novel approaches additionally
integrate initial lower-level perceptual interpretation and catego-
rization processes in order to account for top-down and bottom-
up dynamic interactions within social reasoning (Freeman and
Ambady, 2011). Such models comprehensively explain how cat-
egories and corresponding stereotypes along with individuating
information are used to form impressions of others and to
understand their personality characteristics and current men-
tal states. Furthermore, the general ability to attribute men-
tal states such as beliefs and intentions to oneself and others
in order to understand and predict behavior has been investi-
gated with reference to “theory of mind” (ToM) (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978). A prominent way to assess this ability is to
use “false belief tasks” with social scenarios or non-verbal cues
where test persons have to differentiate between their own per-
ceptions, attitudes, or beliefs from those of others (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983). Neuroimaging studies were able to associate
this inferential and category-based social processing with a net-
work consisting of the medial prefrontal, the retrosplenial and
the temporo-parietal cortices, among others (Vogeley et al., 2001;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Harris et al., 2005; Mitchell et al.,
2005; Schiller et al., 2009), by using mostly, though not exclu-
sively, verbal stimulus material (Walter et al., 2004; Freeman et al.,
2010a).
While these studies obviously focus on types of knowledge
and reasoning we all use extensively in our everyday life, it has
become increasingly clear that other ways of processing person-
related information are equally or sometimes even more signifi-
cant. For example, individuals with high functioning autism, who
can pass explicit experimental false belief tasks as well as con-
trols, are still impaired in their daily social life and are unable
to transfer this knowledge into more complex and ecologically
valid situations (Klin et al., 2003). The remaining impairments
are supposed to relate to difficulties in spontaneously attending
to socially meaningful stimuli in real world environments and
in experiencing social stimuli as significant (Klin et al., 2003;
Senju et al., 2009; Kuzmanovic et al., 2011). This example high-
lights the importance of taking into account influences of the
affective value of social cues in a comprehensive investigation
of person perception. While the outcome of the initial catego-
rization and of inferential analyses of person-related information
also crucially affects subsequent evaluations and behavior toward
the target person (Freeman and Ambady, 2011), this category
and inference-dependent influence can be distinguished from
affective influences of salient social cues on the decoder. Such
affective and motivational effects are present before categorical
social knowledge has fully developed (Farroni et al., 2002), and
can act independently of top-down attention control (see next
section).
AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES OF PERSON-RELATED
INFORMATION ON THE DECODER
In general, humans’ decision making is influenced by emotional
factors (Slovic and Peters, 2006; De Martino et al., 2008). Such
influences can be triggered by stimuli that have a predispositional
or primary affective value, such as food and social cues includ-
ing attractive faces or emotional expressions (Aharon et al., 2001;
Bray and O’Doherty, 2007; Lin et al., 2012). Alternatively, stim-
uli can acquire an affective value through classical conditioning
(also “Pavlovian conditioning”), i.e., when neutral stimuli acquire
a positive or negative value due to repeated pairing with other
unrelated positive or negative stimuli (Hermans et al., 2002).
Especially during person perception, social cues are necessar-
ily present and can influence the decoder due to their intrinsic
affective value. This influence may concern an enhanced and pri-
oritized processing relating to selective attention to, and recogni-
tion and representation of stimuli. Furthermore, social cues may
also function as incentives and thus lead to reward-dependent
learning.
Regarding the influence related to prioritized processing, neu-
roimaging studies have shown that face processing is enhanced
for emotionally expressive as compared to neutral stimuli as a
result of the modulatory influence of the amygdala (Vuilleumier
and Pourtois, 2007). Known to play a central role in detect-
ing affectively significant sensory input (Sander et al., 2003), the
amygdala is able to modulate activity in brain networks associated
with visual face processing and with other cognitive and affective
responses in favor of the more salient emotional information via
massive reciprocal connections (Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007;
Pessoa, 2008; Robinson et al., 2010). Consistent across a line of
studies, non-verbal person-related information including facial
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and bodily expressions as well as invariant facial features such
as attractiveness or race elicits enhanced activity in the amyg-
dala (Phelps et al., 2000; Hariri et al., 2002; Lieberman et al.,
2005; Sergerie et al., 2008; Kuzmanovic et al., 2012). Moreover,
increased activation of the amygdala has also been found for social
stimuli in general, i.e., for neutral stimuli too and is thus inde-
pendent of their valence, when compared to non-social stimuli
(Vrticka et al., 2012). Critically, amygdala-driven modulation of
visual processing by emotional information is also detectable for
non-attended stimuli, i.e., without voluntary control or conscious
awareness (Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001; Vuilleumier et al.,
2001). Moreover, patients with lesions in the visual cortex who
cannot achieve conscious visual experience can still discriminate
facial expressions of emotions—presumably via a subcortical cir-
cuit including the superior colliculus, thalamus, and the amygdala
(Adolphs, 2002). Similarly, autonomicmeasures demonstrate that
patients with prosopagnosia, who are unable to recognize familiar
faces, can still discriminate familiar from unfamiliar faces on an
unconscious level (Ellis and Lewis, 2001). Thus, this subcortical
processing may mediate affective influences independently of the
activation of category-organized knowledge structures.
The described sensitivity of the amygdala to salient stimuli may
play a central role in attracting the attention toward meaningful
social cues. When this function is impaired, as in patients with
amygdala lesions, spontaneous recognition of emotional expres-
sions of faces is reduced (Adolphs et al., 2002), unless these
patients have been explicitly instructed to attend to the informa-
tive eye region (Adolphs et al., 2005). Furthermore, in contrast to
healthy or hippocampus-lesioned persons, patients with amyg-
dala lesions do not demonstrate increased activation in visual
face-related brain regions for fearful relative to neutral faces,
but they show increased activation in these regions when faces
are presented in a task-relevant relative to task-irrelevant posi-
tion (Vuilleumier et al., 2004). Hence, the top-down attentional
modulations by task demands can act independently of the mod-
ulations by affective significance of the stimuli via the amygdala
(Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007).
Beyond these general affective influences related to priori-
tized processing, social cues can modulate affective responses to
unrelated, but simultaneously or subsequently presented stimuli.
Extending prior neuroimaging findings that face attractiveness or
gaze following induce activity in reward-associated neural areas
such as the orbitofrontal cortex and the ventral striatum (Aharon
et al., 2001; Kranz and Ishai, 2006; Schilbach et al., 2010), pleas-
ant social stimuli were also able to establish affective values in
abstract and initially neutral stimuli by means of classical con-
ditioning (Bray and O’Doherty, 2007). Thus, just like other types
of reward such as food or money, person-related information can
influence our evaluations of arbitrary stimuli when paired with
them. Although the study by Bray and O’Doherty refers to classi-
cal conditioning and demonstrates the involvement of the ventral
striatum, which has previously been associated with learning
based on this principle, the fact that the measured effect relates
to an evaluative attitude and not only to an affective response
calls for a more precise reference to the similar, but not identi-
cal evaluative conditioning. This field of research provides fur-
ther behavioral empirical evidence for influences of valent social
stimuli such as likeable and dislikeable faces on the evaluation of
neutral facial stimuli (Baeyens et al., 1992; Walther et al., 2005).
In addition to their effect in classical and evaluative conditioning,
which change the attitude and the affective reaction to previously
neutral stimuli, positive and negative facial expressions were also
shown to modulate complex consumption behavior. Subliminally
presented smiling faces increased the consumption of and the
willingness to pay for beverages while frowns had the opposite
effect (Winkielman et al., 2005). Interestingly, these effects on
overt behavior occurred without eliciting changes in conscious
feelings. Such effects, “in which the motivational characteristics of
a predictor influence the vigor of an action with respect to which
it is formally completely independent are called “Pavlovian-
Instrumental Transfer” (PIT) (Talmi et al., 2008, p. 360). The
PIT has been shown to be mediated by the ventral striatum and
the amygdala, in concordance with the regulatory role of these
regions in integration of affective-motivational, cognitive, and
motor processing in the brain (Talmi et al., 2008).
Taken together, these findings suggest that humans are
equipped with motivational predispositions to respond to
person-related information, among other biologically relevant
stimuli, presumably due to its significance for adaptive social
behavior and, in consequence, survival (Dunbar, 2009). In con-
sequence, social cues may be more efficiently detected for the
purpose of prioritized processing, memorization, and evaluation
(Klin et al., 2003; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007). Furthermore,
this affective or motivational value of social cues can also influ-
ence simple approach-avoidance (Chen and Bargh, 1999) and
complex instrumental behaviors (Winkielman et al., 2005) via
reward-dependent learning.
PROCESSING DIFFERENCES FOR DISTINCT FORMATS OF
PERSON-RELATED INFORMATION
While the basic sensory and cognitive processing of verbal and
non-verbal information is generally associated with distinct neu-
ral areas, there are also format-dependent differences specifically
related to social processing. From very early on, psychological the-
ories of interpersonal communication assumed that non-verbal
information has been assumed to have a greater impact on the
affective, relational level of communication (Watzlawick et al.,
1967). Furthermore, linguistically encoded information always
requires the processing of an explicit semantic code with a com-
plex logical syntax and is thus necessarily linked to high-level
cognitive processing, while non-verbal information lacks such an
explicit interpretation code (Bente and Kraemer, 2008; Kraemer,
2008).
Recently, neuroimaging studies could provide empirical sup-
port for these assumptions by showing that the processing of
non-verbal person information consistently recruits the amygdala
(Hariri et al., 2002; Winston et al., 2002; Sergerie et al., 2008;
Todorov and Engell, 2008; Todorov et al., 2008). By contrast,
social inferences based on verbal descriptions of other persons’
actions or traits, as well as explicit categorization of facial stim-
uli involved medial prefrontal, retrosplenial and temporo-parietal
cortical brain regions (Mitchell et al., 2002, 2005; Harris et al.,
2005; Schiller et al., 2009; Freeman et al., 2010a; Zaki et al., 2010).
Only a few studies directly compared the processing of verbal
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and non-verbal information and further substantiated the view
that different neural networks show relatively stronger links to
the one or the other information format (Freeman et al., 2010b;
Zaki et al., 2010; Kuzmanovic et al., 2012). For instance, during a
person evaluation task, evaluations of increasing intensity based
on non-verbal information recruited the amygdala to a greater
extent, whereas the same pattern was observed in the retros-
plenial cortex for verbal information (Kuzmanovic et al., 2012).
This finding confirms qualitatively different cognitive processes
underlying person perception with a closer relation of non-verbal
information and salience-dependent processing on the one hand,
and of verbal information and the high-level social cognition on
the other.
In addition to the differences outlined for the information for-
mat, the context and the content of social cues modulate social
processing in a complex manner. For instance, it has been sup-
posed that social cognitive processes fundamentally differ when
people engage in direct interpersonal interactions than when
merely observing social cues, a topic that is beyond the scope
of the present article [for a discussion on the second-person
approach see Schilbach et al. (2013)]. Taken together, the exact
format, context and content of the information that is available
during person perception can critically determine the kind of
cognitive processes recruited. While both inferential-categorical
processing and affective influences may take place for all sources
of information, possible effects have to be differentially weighted
for distinct kinds of person stimuli.
INTEGRATION OF DISTINCT BUT INTERACTIVE PERSON
PERCEPTION ASPECTS
Although different processes with distinct functional implica-
tions can be delineated for person perception, they also have
to be considered as embedded in a strongly interconnected
neural network, thereby reciprocally modulating each other.
For instance, the fact that person-related information is able
to influence the observer due to its affective value does not
mean that this influence is absolutely automatic and unfiltered,
without the modulation by reflective and goal-directed pro-
cesses such as voluntary attention and conscious intentions,
appraisals and attitudes (Pessoa, 2008). Exactly this dynamic
interactive nature of social processing including the influence
of sensory cues has been described previously (Freeman and
Ambady, 2011). However, in this model the impact of salient
affective social cues is defined in terms of categories and
corresponding stereotypes without taking into account their
ability to prioritize processing and act as a reward, thereby
constituting a category-independent source of influence on the
beholder.
An example of the top-downmodulation of affective responses
to monetary rewards has been provided both on the behavioral
and neural level. When people believe that their trading part-
ner has a praiseworthy moral character, they rely less on the
actual behavior resulting in monetary losses or wins (Delgado
et al., 2005). On a neural level, this effect corresponds to reduced
differential activity in the ventral striatum in response to posi-
tive and negative outcomes for trading partners with positive or
negative moral character evaluations as compared to neutral part-
ners (Delgado et al., 2005). Thus, personality trait inferences can
greatly influence the reward-dependent, motivational responses
within person perception. On the other hand, however, facial
attractiveness and expression may influence deliberate high-level
judgments about unrelated performances such as political votes
or management success (Ballew and Todorov, 2007; Antonakis
and Dalgas, 2009), an effect mediated by the amygdala (Rule et al.,
2010).
Thus, it can be assumed that there are different concurrent
and mutual modulations during person perception, arising from
both top-down cortical attentional and inferential networks, as
well as from bottom-up primary and secondary sensory areas
(Freeman and Ambady, 2011).We argue, however, that the intrin-
sic affective and motivational value of social stimuli exerts an
additional influence over the general person perception via sub-
cortical regions associated with salience and reward processing.
CONCLUSIONS
In the light of the diversity of findings relating to person per-
ception, person-related information has to be regarded as a
basis for inferences and categorizations as well as a source of
a potential affective-motivational influence on the decoder. As
a complex spontaneous constructive process, and not a simple
one-to-one representation of available cues, person perception
includes a huge amount of uncertainty and is thus prone to biases.
In order to prevent oversimplifications and deficient interpreta-
tions of empirical findings, an integrative theoretical reflection on
person perception should carefully consider affective and moti-
vational effects of person-related information in addition to the
dynamic of interactive cognitive processes previously described
in integrative frameworks.
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